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Abstract
The enlargement of the general-equilibrium structure to allow for default
subject to appropriate credit limits and default penalties results in a construc-
tion of a simple mechanism for a credit using society. We show that there
generically exists a price-normalizing bundle that determines a credit money
along with appropriate credit limits and default penalties for the credit mech-
anism to select a unique competitive equilibrium (CE). With some additional
conditions, a common credit money can be applied such that any CE can
be a unique selection by the credit mechanism with appropriate credit limits
default penalties for the traders. This will include a CE with the minimal
cash ﬂow property. Such CEs are special for the reason that they minimize
the need for a substitute-for-trust (i.e. money) in trade.
KEYWORDS: Competitive equilibrium, credit mechanism, marginal util-
ity of income, IOU, welfare economics. (JEL Classiﬁcation D5, C72, E4)
1 Introduction
The problem of ﬁnding the most general conditions required to guarantee a unique
CE in a general-equilibrium system is complex and challenging mathematically.
∗This version is based on Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper NO. 1539. We wish to thank
Don Brown for helpful comments.
†Department of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9210
‡Economics Department, Yale University, PO Box 208281, New Haven CT 06520-8281
1By enlarging the problem an approach is proposed that both oﬀers a solution and
facilitates an interesting selection.
The general-equilibrium model does not utilize credit or ﬁnancial institutions
because trust is implicitly perfect. All trade is balanced at the end of the market.
It is as if each individual at the start of the model has available implicitly a credit
line equal to the worth of the individual’s initial wealth at the ﬁnal market price.
When trust is imperfect and credit is introduced, however, a mechanism is needed
to determine the worth to an individual at the end of trade. This includes the
possibility of having credit left over and the cost or penalty for ending up in debt.
We consider a credit mechanism for a single period exchange economy that in-
volves a credit money together with a credit limit and a per-unit default penalty for
each trader, such that ending up with net credit is worthless for the trader while
the default penalty is levied against him for ending as a net debtor.1 To see how to
implement the mechanism, consider, for speciﬁcity, that trade is in banknotes which
are provided by a mutual bank. Before trading begins, traders exchange personal
IOUs for banknotes with the bank charging them an interest rate of zero. Each
trader may exchange personal IOUs for banknotes for up to a certain exogenously
speciﬁed total amount. After all traders have received their incomes, they go to the
bank to settle up all outstanding credit.2
Given a credit mechanism, whether it is optimal for a trader to over spend at
prevailing prices depends on the size of the per-unit default penalty relative to his
marginal utility of income. In a general-equilibrium model, a trader’s marginal
utility of income equals the Lagrangian multiplier associated with his utility max-
imization problem; hence, it depends endogenously on the prices. In particular,
scaling up all the prices scales down the trader’s marginal utility of income by equal
amount. It follows that the marginal utility of income of a trader enjoys a degree of
freedom unless prices are normalized.
We are interested in a price normalization that calls for the same value of some
commodity bundle with a positive quantity of each good. We refer to this bundle
1For example, default penalties may be in the form of asset conﬁscation from the debtors or
jail sentences or other societal punishments.
2One way to play the model in a classroom is at the beginning to give each student a large
stack of banknotes and inform him that at the end of the game, after he has bought and received
income from selling, he has to return exactly the amount he started with initially or he will have
to pay a default penalty.
For discussions on various credit mechanisms for the competitive model, the reader is referred
to Shubik (1999).
2as a price-normalizing bundle. When the total endowment bundle of the economy
is used as the price-normalizing bundle, all normalized price systems yield the same
value of the economy’s total wealth.
We begin investigation of the credit mechanism with a useful property of general-
equilibrium analysis. Namely, under some mild conditions, a CE for an economy
corresponds to a saddle-point of a Lagrangian function for each trader. This saddle-
point characterization of a CE has useful applications for price normalization and
for the design of default penalties towards the selection of a unique CE, as well as
for the study of the already familiar welfare properties of CE allocations.
We show that given a CE not equal to any non-negative linear combination of
the other CEs, a ﬁnite iterated process generates a price-normalizing bundle that
determines a credit money along with an appropriate credit limit and default penalty
for each trader for the given CE to be a unique selection by the credit mechanism.
The existence of a CE satisfying the above independence condition is generic. With
some additional conditions, a uniform credit money can be applied such that any
CE can be a unique selection by the credit mechanism with appropriate credit limits
and default penalties for the traders. This will include a CE with the minimal cash
ﬂow property. Such CEs are special for the reason that they minimize the need for
a substitute-for-trust (i.e. money) in trade.3
Our results can be extended to production economies via Rader’s equivalence
principle. For this reason, we conﬁne analysis to pure exchange economies in a large
part of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
brieﬂy discusses saddle-point characterization of a CE and its applications. Section
3 presents results for pure exchange economies. Section 4 discusses extensions to
3Allen, Dutta, and Polemarchakis (2002) consider CE selections of a diﬀerent nature. They
begin with a random selection, which is a probability distribution over the set of CEs. Such a
distribution introduces an additional source of uncertainty. They then consider an enlargement of
the general-equilibrium structure to allow traders to insure against such additional uncertainties
by opening asset markets contingent on the CEs prior to spot market trading. The problem of the
multiplicity of the CEs, however, cannot be resolved with such asset markets (see Proposition 1 in
Allen, et al 2002).
By taking expectation with respect to the implied distribution over the CEs by a random se-
lection, a reallocation of the endowments is obtained. Taking the bundles in the reallocation as
traders’ new endowments, a new set of CEs will be obtained to which the random selection can be
repeated. This way, an iterative process is established. Allen, et al (2002) show that the process
converges to an allocation of endowments that implies a unique CE (see Proposition 2 in their pa-
per). Note, however, this iterative process is of non-tˆ atonnement nature and is, therefore, diﬀerent
from the iterative process of price normalization in the present paper.
3economies with production and section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Saddle-Point Characterization of Competitive
Equilibria
Consider an exchange economy E = {Xi,ui,ai}n
i=1 with trader i’s consumption set
Xi, utility function ui, and endowment ai. We assume A1: Xi = <m
+; A2: ui is
continuous and concave; A3: ai ∈ <m
+ with ai 6 =0; and A4: For each 1 ≤ h ≤ m,
there is a trader i such that ui(xi + δeh) > ui(xi) for all xi ∈ <m
+ and for all δ > 0,
where eh ∈ <m with eh
h = 1 and eh
k = 0 for all k 6 =h.4 These are familiar assumptions
in general-equilibrium analysis. A CE for economy E is a pair (¯ x, ¯ p) with allocation
¯ x = (¯ x1,···, ¯ xn) and price vector ¯ p such that ¯ xi solves
maximize ui(xi)
subject to (i) ¯ p · (ai − xi) ≥ 0
(ii) xi ∈ <m
+
(Utility Maximization) (1)








i. (Market Clearance) (2)
2.1 A Saddle Point Characterization
To apply the Saddle-Point Theorem, notice ﬁrst that due to A4, all CE prices are
positive. The saddle-point characterization of CEs in Theorem 1 below is well-
known:5
Theorem 1 (Saddle-Point Characterization) Let E = {Xi,ui,ai}n
i=1 be an ex-
change economy satisfying A1-A4. Then, a pair (¯ x, ¯ p) ∈ <mn
+ ×<m
++ is a CE if and
only if ¯ x satisﬁes (2) and there exists a vector ¯ λ ∈ <n
++ such that for all i the triplet
(¯ xi, ¯ p, ¯ λi) satisﬁes
u
i(x
i) + ¯ λ
i¯ p · (a
i − x
i) ≤ u
i(¯ x) + ¯ λ
i¯ p · (a




i¯ p · (a
i − ¯ x
i) (3)
for all xi ∈ <m
+ and for all λi ∈ <+.
4For any positive integer q, <
q
+ denotes the non-negative orthant of the q-dimensional Euclidean
space and <
q
++ denotes the subset of <
q
+ containing vectors in <
q
+ all with positive components.
5A proof can be established by applying the saddle-point characterization of solutions of a non-
linear programming problem. See Takayama (1985, p. 75) for the saddle-point characterization.
4Notice that condition (3) is equivalent to (¯ xi, ¯ λi) being a saddle-point for the
Lagrangian of the utility maximization problem (1). When a triplet (¯ x, ¯ p, ¯ λ) satisﬁes
(2) and (3), we call it a competitive triplet and we call ¯ x, ¯ p, and ¯ λ, respectively, a
competitive allocation, a competitive price vector, and a competitive multiplier vector.
Two applications of Theorem 1 are relevant to the rest of the paper. Corollary
1 below shows that a competitive allocation maximizes a weighted welfare function
with the welfare weights equal to the reciprocals of the associated competitive multi-
pliers. Corollary 2 shows that under some additional conditions, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between competitive equilibria and competitive multiplier vectors.
Corollary 1 is familiar and follows easily from Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 Assume E = {Xi,ui,ai}n













i=1(ai − xi) ≥ 0
(ii) xi ∈ <m
+,i = 1,2,···,n.
(4)
Corollary 2 Assume E = {Xi,ui,ai}n
i=1 satisﬁes A1 and A4. Assume further
A2
0: ui is continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly concave;
A5: CE allocations are all interior allocations.6
Then, there is a one-to-one correspondence between CEs and competitive multi-
plier vectors for economy E.
Proof. Let (¯ x, ¯ p) be a CE. Then, by A5, ¯ xi ∈ <m
++ for all i. Consequently, by
A2
0 and by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, competitive multiplier vectors ¯ λ ∈ <n
+ that
correspond to (¯ x, ¯ p) satisfy 7
5u
i(¯ x
i) = ¯ λ
i¯ p, i = 1,2,···,n.
6A suﬃcient condition to guarantee the interiority of the CE allocations is for all i, ui(xi) >
ui(yi) whenever xi is an interior bundle and yi is a corner bundle. The reason is that all CE prices
are strictly positive under A4 and hence the value of each trader’s endowment at these prices are
positive.
7Here 5ui(¯ xi) denotes the gradient of ui at ¯ xi.
5The uniqueness of the associated competitive multiplier vector follows from the
above equation.
Conversely, with the strict concavity of utility functions, problem (4) has a
unique solution given competitive multiplier vector ¯ λ. It thus follows from Corollary
1 that ¯ λ determines a unique competitive allocation ¯ x. Since, by A5, ¯ xi ∈ <m
++ for
all i, it follows from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for problem (4) that there is a






¯ λi 5 u
i(¯ x
i).
Thus, the Lagrangian multiplier vector for problem (4) is unique. Since the price
vector associated with competitive allocation ¯ x is necessarily a Lagrangian multiplier
vector for problem (4), it is thus unique.
The one-to-one correspondence in Corollary 2 implies that the products ¯ λi¯ p,
i = 1,2,···,n, are uniquely determined in every CE under the conditions in the
corollary.
3 Price Normalization and Selection of CEs
Competitive equilibrium prices are homogeneous of degree zero. Consequently,
prices can be normalized without changing competitive allocations. When normaliz-
ing the prices, however, economists rarely consider the eﬀects of price normalization
on competitive multipliers, hence on marginal utilities of income of the traders. In
what follows it will become clear that those eﬀects are important for the construction
of a credit mechanism.
3.1 A Credit Mechanism
Competitive multipliers are known as marginal utilities of income. By Corollary 2,
normalizing the prices would change these marginal utilities accordingly. To consider
the possibility of selecting a unique CE using a credit mechanism, the sizes of the
per-unit default penalties relative to the marginal utilities of income at CEs turn
out to be essential.
Suppose that traders use banknotes to buy or sell goods. A bank provides all
traders with banknotes with zero interest. Before trading begins, traders exchange
6personal IOUs for banknotes. Let Ci
m+1 ⊆ <+ denote the set of quantities of the
banknotes that trader i can obtain with his personal IOUs. The maximum quantity
in this set is the credit limit the bank provides to trader i. After he has bought
and received income from selling, trader i settles up all outstanding credit with the
bank. It is of no value to him to end as a net creditor, while he will be penalized
for ending as a net debtor.
Let P ⊆ <m
+ denote a compact set of normalized price vectors with P ∩<m
++ 6 =∅.







i | p ∈ P

.
Now let ¯ p ∈ P be any competitive price vector. By A4, ¯ p ∈ <m
++. Since ai ∈ <m
+
and ai 6 =0 by A1 and A3, we have ¯ p·ai < ¯ p·
Pn
j=1 aj. This inequality together with
the above deﬁnition of V implies that ¯ p · ai < V for all i.
Set Ci
m+1 = [0,V ] for all i. This means that each trader i can obtain credit
more than he could repay with the worth of his endowment at any normalized price
vector in P. However, trader i pays a penalty of µi > 0 for each unit of debt he is
unable to repay. Let µ = (µi) denote the vector of these per-unit penalties.
The preceding credit limits and default penalties together with the requirement
that trade be in banknotes (credit money) results in a credit mechanism that trans-








m+1 denotes the amount of excess credit. It is the amount of debt when
xi
m+1 < 0 or credit left over when xi
m+1 > 0.
In summary, a credit mechanism as outlined above is completely characterized
by specifying a price normalization P for determining a credit money and for each
i, a credit limit Ci
m+1 and a per-unit penalty µi. In short, a credit mechanism is
denoted by Γ = {P,{Ci
m+1,µi}i∈N}.
Deﬁnition 1 Let E = {Xi,ui,ai}i∈N be an exchange economy. The credit mech-
anism Γ selects a CE, (ˆ x, ˆ p), of E if (ˆ x, ˆ xm+1, ˆ p) is a CE for Eµ with ˆ xm+1 =
(ˆ x1
m+1,···, ˆ xn
m+1) and ˆ xi
m+1 = 0 for all i.
The following theorem provides a connection of the CEs of Eµ with those of E.
Theorem 2 Let E = {Xi,ui,ai}i∈N be an exchange economy. Assume E satisﬁes
A1-A4. Assume further prices are normalized so that the resulting normalized price
7vectors consist of a compact set P ∩ <m
++ 6 =∅. If ((x∗,x∗
m+1),p∗) is a CE for Eµ,
then x∗i
m+1 = 0 for all i and for some competitive multiplier vector λ∗ ∈ <n
++ with
λ∗ ≤ µ, (x∗,p∗,λ∗) is a competitive triplet for E.
Proof. Let ((x∗,x∗
m+1),p∗) be a CE for Eµ. Since being a net creditor is worthless
and since traders are price-taking, we conclude that for all i ∈ N, x∗i
m+1 ≤ 0. This
implies that (x∗i,x∗i
m+1) solves
Maximize ui(xi) + µixi
m+1
Subject to p∗ · ai − p∗ · xi ≥ xi
m+1,
xi ∈ <m
+, p∗ · ai − V ≤ xi
m+1 ≤ 0.












m+1 + λi(p∗ · ai − p∗ · x∗i − x∗i
m+1)
(5)
for all xi ∈ <m
+, all p∗ · ai − V ≤ xi
m+1 ≤ 0, and for all λi ∈ <+.
The non-satiation of ui together with the ﬁrst inequality in (5) implies λ∗i > 0.












i∈N ai and since x∗i
m+1 ≤ 0 for all i, it follows from (6) that
x∗i
m+1 = 0 for all i.
Since x∗i
m+1 = 0, by (5), (x∗i,p∗,λ∗i) satisﬁes (3). Thus, (x∗,p∗,λ∗) is a competi-










Since p∗ · ai < V , the condition λ∗i ≤ µi follows from the above inequality.
When a competitive multiplier vector ¯ λ associated with a CE is such that ¯ λi > µi
for some i, the per-unit penalty on trader i is not severe enough, in the sense that on
the margin i gains from being in debt. When this occurs, the budget constraint will
be violated. Since no one ends as a net creditor, the market for commodities will
be imbalanced. Hence, such a CE cannot survive the credit mechanism. A direct
application of Theorem 2 implies:
8Corollary 3 Let E = {Xi,ui,ai}i∈N be an exchange economy. Assume E satisﬁes
A1-A4. Assume further prices are normalized so that the resulting normalized price
vectors consist of a compact set P ∩ <m
++ 6 =∅. Then, only those CEs of E with
multiplier vectors λ ≤ µ are selected by the credit mechanism.





+ | p · r ≡ constant

for some price-normalizing bundle r ∈ <m
++. Without loss of generality, we may take
the constant to be 1. Given a CE, Corollary 3 shows that a suﬃcient condition for it
to be uniquely selected is that there exits a price-normalizing bundle, under which
the competitive multiplier vector associated with it does not dominate the com-
petitive multiplier vector of every other CE. With such a price-normalizing bundle,
Corollary 3 implies that the given CE is the unique selection for the credit mecha-
nism with a non-discriminatory default penalty equal to the maximum multiplier of
the associated competitive multiplier vector.
3.2 Price Normalization for Selection of a Unique CE
In this subsection, we show that in general a price-normalizing bundle exists with
which default penalties can be speciﬁed for the credit mechanism to select a unique
CE. To this end, we conﬁne attention to exchange economies with ﬁnitely many
CEs. This is not too restrictive because the property of having ﬁnitely many CEs
is generic.8 We will apply the following theorem of the alternative for matrices.
Theorem 3 (Theorem of the Alternative for Matrices) Let A = (aij) be a
m × k matrix. Then, either (i) or (ii) must hold:
(i) The origin 0 ∈ <m is contained in the convex hull of the k vectors
aj = (a1j,a2j,···,amj), j = 1,2,···,k
and the m unit vectors ei ∈ <m with
eij =
(
1 if i = j;
0 if i 6 =j.
8A technical problem with there being inﬁnitely many CEs is that we are no longer able to
apply the result on the alternative for matrices as stated in Theorem 3 below.
9(ii) There exists a vector r ∈ <m
++ such that aj · r > 0 for j = 1,2,···,k.
Proof. See Lemma II.4.3 in Owen (1982, pp. 17-18) for a proof.
Let (ˆ x, ˆ p) be a CE for economy E. Assume that the price vector ˆ p is not equal
to any non-negative linear combination of the competitive price vectors associated
with the other CEs.9 Now consider an iterative process that begins from the price
normalization with price-normalizing bundle e = (1,1,···,1) ∈ <m. This is the













Let the other CEs of E be indexed as (ˆ x(j), ˆ p(j)), j = 1,2,···,k.
Lemma 1 Assume A1, A2’, and A3-A5 are satisﬁed. Assume further ˆ p 6 =
Pk
j=1 αjˆ p(j)








Proof. Suppose on the contrary that 0 is in the convex hull. Then, there exist











ˆ p(j) · e
−
ˆ p





βiei = 0. (7)
Taking the inner product with e on both sides of (7) yields
P
i βi = 0. This together





which contradicts the assumption that ˆ p is not equal to any non-negative linear









ˆ p(j) · e
.
Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 together imply that under the assumptions in Lemma 1,
there exists a bundle in <m
++ which we denote by r1 such that
 ˆ p(j)
ˆ p(j) · e
−
ˆ p




9This is equivalent to the condition that when normalized to be in the price simplex,
ˆ p
ˆ p·e is not
in the convex hull of
ˆ p(j)






1, j = 1,···,k. (8)




p1 · r1 and p
2(j) =
p1(j)
p1(j) · r1. (9)
Lemma 2 Assume conditions in Lemma 1 are satisﬁed. Then, there exists r1 ∈
<m
++ such that (8) is satisﬁed and 0 ∈ <m is not in the convex hull of the vectors
{
p1·r1
ˆ p1(j)·r1p2(j) − p2}k
j=1 ∪ {ei}m
i=1.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary for any r1 satisfying (8), there exist non-negative


















βiei = 0. (10)
By (9), p2 · r1 = 1 and p2(j) · r1 = 1 for all j. By taking the inner product with r1




 p1 · r1







i = 0. (11)
Since scaling down r1 does not change the ratios p1 · r1/ˆ p(j) · r1 neither does it
change inequality (8), the weights αj, βi in (10) remain unchanged as r1 is scaled
down. However, as r1 is scaled down, the second term on the left-hand-side of (11)
approaches to zero while the ﬁrst sum stays constant. By (8),
p1 · r1
p1(j) · r1 − 1 < 0, j = 1,2,···,k
and by (10), αj > 0 for at least one j. It follows that the ﬁrst sum on the left-hand-
side of (11) remains constant and negative as r1 is scaled down. This establishes
the desired contradiction.








2, j = 1,···,k. (12)




p2 · r2 and p
3(j) =
p2(j)
p2(j) · r2. (13)
By (8) and (12),
p2 · r2
p2(j) · r2 <
p1 · r1
p1(j) · r1 < 1.
Hence, it follows from (8), (12), and (13) that the proof of Lemma 2 can be adapted









To iterate this process inductively, suppose that for t ≥ 2, p1,···,pt−1,pt and
p1(j),···,pt−1(j),pt(j) for all j have been determined such that for some strictly
positive bundles r1,···,rt ∈ <m
++
pτ−1 · rτ−1







for j = 1,···,k and τ = 2,···,t. Using rt as the normalizing bundle, we can




pt · rt and p
t+1(j) =
pt(j)
pt(j) · rt, j = 1,2,···,k. (15)
By (14),
pt · rt
pt(j) · rt < 1
for all j. It follows that the proof of Lemma 2 can be adapted to prove Lemma 3
below.
Lemma 3 Assume conditions in Lemma 1 are satisﬁed. Assume further for t ≥
2, r1,···,rt−1,rt, p1,···,pt−1,pt, and p1(j),···,pt−1(j),pt(j), for all j, have been
determined such that (14) is satisﬁed. Then, bundle rt ∈ <m
++ can be so chosen that
0 ∈ <m is not in the convex hull of the vectors


















t+1, j = 1,2,···,k.
Thus, by induction, the process can be iterated for any ﬁnite number of times.
We now show that the process leads to the existence of a price-normalizing bundle
in <m
++ with which the competitive multiplier vector associated with (ˆ x, ˆ p) is the
smallest.
Theorem 4 Assume A1, A2’, and A3-A5 are satisﬁed. Let (ˆ x, ˆ p) and (ˆ x(j), ˆ p(j)),
j = 1,2,···,k be the CEs for E. Assume ˆ p 6 =
Pk
j=1 αjˆ p(j) for any αj ≥ 0 for all
j. Then, there exists a price-normalizing bundle ˆ r ∈ <m
++ with which the associ-
ated competitive multiplier vector with (ˆ x,
ˆ p
ˆ p·ˆ r) is strictly dominated by the associated
competitive multiplier vector with (ˆ x(j),
ˆ p(j)
ˆ p(j)·ˆ r), for j = 1,2,···,k.
Proof. Denote the competitive multiplier associated with (ˆ x, ˆ p) by ˆ λ and that with
(ˆ x(j), ˆ p(j)) by ˆ λ(j) for j = 1,2,···,k. The process of iterated price normalization
generates sequences {rt}, {pt}, and {pt(j)} for all j that satisfy (14) and (15) with
r0 = e, ˆ p0 = ˆ p, and ˆ p0(j) = ˆ p(j). Since the CE allocations remain unchanged










































pτ−1(j) · rτ−1 <
 ˆ p · e
ˆ p(j) · e






p1(j)·r1 < 1, the right-hand-side of (18) approaches to 0 as the number
of iterations gets large. Consequently, since ˆ λ(j) >> 0 for all j, there exists a
positive integer ˆ t such that (17) holds for t ≥ ˆ t. Set ˆ r = r
ˆ t. The proof is completed




ˆ p · rt and p
t(j) =
ˆ p(j)
ˆ p(j) · rt
for all t ≥ 0. Hence, pt and pt(j) are obtained from normalizing ˆ p and ˆ p(j) through
price-normalizing bundle rt, respectively.
Corollary 3 and Theorem 4 together imply the following selection of a unique
CE:
Corollary 4 (Selection of a Unique CE) Assume A1, A2’, and A3-A5 are satis-
ﬁed. Then, there exists a price-normalizing bundle ˆ r with which the credit mechanism
selects a unique CE with some non-discriminatory default penalty.
Proof. Let e be the price-normalizing bundle. Then, the set of normalized com-
petitive price vectors is a compact subset of the price simplex ∆m. Thus, by the
Krein-Milman Theorem, it has an extreme point.10 Let (ˆ x, ˆ p) be a CE such that
ˆ p
ˆ p·e is an extreme point in the set of normalized competitive price vectors. Then,
ˆ p cannot be equal to any non-negative linear combination of other CE price vec-
tors. By Theorem 4, there exists a price-normalizing bundle ˆ r ∈ <m
++ such that the
competitive multiplier vector associated with (ˆ x,
ˆ p
ˆ p·ˆ r) is strictly dominated by the
competitive multiplier vector associated with every other CE under price normal-
ization through ˆ r. Consequently, by Corollary 3, with price-normalizing bundle ˆ r
(ˆ x,
ˆ p
ˆ p·ˆ r) is a unique selection for the credit mechanism with default penalties all equal
to the maximum multiplier of the competitive multiplier vector associated with it.
3.2.1 Selection with a Uniform Price-Normalizing Bundle
In this subsection we consider price-normalizing bundles, with which the credit
mechanism uniquely selects any CE with appropriate default penalties. By Theorem
2, such unique selections require that the resulting competitive multiplier vectors
do not dominate each other. We assume:
10See Royden (1968, p. 207).
14A6: There exists a bundle r ∈ <m
++ such that for any two interior Pareto optimal
allocations ¯ x and ˆ x,
5ui(¯ xi) · r > 5ui(ˆ xi) · r for some i
=⇒
5uj(¯ xj) · r < 5uj(ˆ xj) · r for some j.
The inner product of the gradient 5ui(xi) with bundle r is the directional deriva-
tive of ui at xi in direction r. It measures the instantaneous rate of change in trader
i’s utility caused by a change from bundle xi to bundle xi+δr for some small number
δ > 0, that is, 5ui(xi) · r is the limit of
ui(xi + δr) − ui(xi)
δ
as δ > 0 approaches to zero. The following two examples all have three interior CEs
and all satisfy A6.
Example 1: (Shapley and Shubik 1977) There are two goods and two traders with
endowments a1 = (40,0), a2 = (0,50) and utility functions u1(x1) = x1
1 + 100(1 −
e−x1
2/10), u2(x2) = 110(1−ex2
1/10)+x2
2 on <2
+. Traders 1 and 2 are respectively named
Ivan and John in Shapley and Shubik (1977); goods 1 and 2 are respectively called
rubles and dollars in their paper. There are three interior CEs in this economy.





1 + 50 − 10ln110. (19)
Notice 5u1(x1) = (1,10e−x1
2/10) and 5u2(x2) = (11e−x2
1/10,1). Equation (19)
implies that to be Pareto optimal, trader 2’s consumption of good 2 increases with
his consumption of good 1. Since trader 1’s marginal utility of good 1 is constant
and his marginal utility of good 2 is decreasing while trader 2’s marginal utility of
good 2 is constant and his marginal utility of good 1 is decreasing, this example
satisﬁes A6 for any bundle r ∈ <2
++.
Example 2: (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green 1995, pp. 521-522) There are two
goods and two traders with endowments a1 = (2,r), a2 = (r,2), r > 0, and utility
functions u1(x1) = x1
1 − 1
8(x1




++. There are three






2 = 1. (20)
15Notice 5u1(x1) = (1,(x1
2)−9) and 5u2(x2) = ((x2
1)−9,1). Equation (20) implies
that to be Pareto optimal, any increase in trader 1’s consumption of good 2 leads to
a decrease in trader 2’s consumption of good 1. Since trader 1’s marginal utility of
good 1 is constant and his marginal utility of good 2 is decreasing while trader 2’s
marginal utility of good 2 is constant and his marginal utility of good 1 is decreasing,
this example satisﬁes A6 for any bundle r ∈ <2
++.
We now establish the non-dominance of the traders’ marginal utilities of income
at CEs.
Theorem 5 (Non-Dominance) Assume E = {Xi,ui,ai}n
i=1 satisﬁes A1, A2
0, and
A4-A6. Let r be a bundle as in A6. Then, for any two competitive triplets (¯ x, ¯ p, ¯ λ)
and (ˆ x, ˆ p, ˆ λ), ¯ p · r = ˆ p · r implies that ¯ λ ≥ ˆ λ and ¯ λ 6 =ˆ λ cannot hold.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that there are two competitive triplets (¯ x, ¯ p, ¯ λ) and
(ˆ x, ˆ p, ˆ λ) with ¯ p · r = ˆ p · r and
¯ λ ≥ ˆ λ and ¯ λ 6 =ˆ λ. (21)
Since r ∈ <m
++ and since ¯ p · r = ˆ p · r > 0, (21) implies
¯ λ
i¯ p · r ≥ ˆ λ
iˆ p · r
for all i and
¯ λ
j¯ p · r > ˆ λ
jˆ p · r
for at least one j. However, by A2
0, A5, and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, ¯ λk¯ p =
5uk(¯ xk) and ˆ λkˆ p = 5uk(ˆ xk) for all k. The above dominance of vector (¯ λi¯ p·r) over
vector (ˆ λiˆ p · r) then contradicts A6.
Combining Theorem 5 with Corollary 3, we can now establish:
Corollary 5 (Selection of a Unique CE) Let E = {Xi,ui,ai}i∈N be an exchange
economy. Assume E satisﬁes A1, A3, A2
0, and A4-A6. Then, under the price





+ | p · r ≡ 1

with bundle r as in A6, every CE, (¯ x, ¯ p), of E is a unique selection by the credit
mechanism with default penalties µ = ¯ λ, where ¯ λ is the competitive multiplier asso-
ciated with (¯ x, ¯ p).
16We end this section with an example to demonstrate the total cash ﬂows and
the Lagrangian multipliers in CEs.
Example 3: Consider the 2-person economy of Shapley and Shubik (1977). As
we showed in Example 1, for this economy A6 is satisﬁed even when we replace
“for some bundle r ∈ <2
++” with “for all bundles r ∈ <2
++”. Thus, we can choose
r = a1 + a2 to be a price-normalizing bundle. If we normalize the prices by the
condition p·r = 1,000, so that the economy’s total wealth is always 1,000, then the
competitive price vectors, competitive multiplier vectors, total cash ﬂows are as in
the following table, all with a two-digit decimal rounding oﬀ:
x∗ p∗ λ∗ TW TCF
CE1 ((32.26, 39.26), (7.74, 10.74)) (3.4, 17.27) (0.29, 0.06) 1000 704.34
CE2 ((13.17, 20.18), (26.83, 29.82)) (12.9, 9.68) (0.08, 0.1) 1000 541.45
CE3 ((3.22, 10.23), (36.78, 39.77)) (18.5, 5.19) (0.05, 1.9) 1000 733.52
In this table, TW stands for the total wealth of the economy and TCF for the
total cash ﬂow. The cash ﬂow required from trader i at prices p1,p2 and bundle xi




2} and the total cash ﬂow required
in a CE is the sum of the cash ﬂows required from both traders at their respective
equilibrium bundles and the equilibrium prices. Notice that the middle CE (CE2) is
the only minimum cash ﬂow CE. To uniquely select it, we can set the per-unit default
penalties equal to the traders’ competitive multipliers 0.08 and 0.1. Alternatively,
we can also choose a non-discriminatory per-unit default penalty equal to 0.1. In
fact, it follows from the proof of Theorem 3 that any non-discriminatory per-unit
default penalties between 0.1 and the next highest maximum competitive multiplier
which is equal to 0.19 would work.
4 Selection with Production
An economy with l goods, n consumers, and household production is an array E =
{(Xi,ui,ai,Y i)}i∈N, where N is the consumer set, Xi ⊆ <m is the consumption set
of consumer i, ui is i’s utility function, ai is his endowment bundle, and Y i ⊆ <m
is his household production possibility set.11 An element yi in Y i represents a
11This model of an economy was considered in Hurwicz (1960), Rader (1964), Shapley (1973),
Billera (1974), among others.
17production plan that i can carry out. As usual, inputs into production appear as
negative components of yi and outputs as positive components. For all i ∈ N, Xi
and Y i are closed and convex.
4.1 Competitive Allocations
With household production, a production plan changes a consumer’s initial endow-
ment before trading. Hence, the selection of a production plan by an individual
is guided by utility maximization instead of proﬁt maximization. However, with
price-taking traders, utility maximization implies proﬁt maximization.










(i) For i ∈ N, p∗·x∗i = p∗·ai+p∗·y∗i and ui(xi) > ui(x∗i) implies p∗·xi > p∗·ai+p∗·yi









In the Arrow-Debreu model of an economy with m < ∞ goods, there are a set, N, of
ﬁnitely many consumers with consumer i ∈ N characterized by the triplet (Xi,ui,ai)
and a set, J, of producers with producer j ∈ J characterized by a production
possibility set Y j. In addition, each consumer i is also endowed with a relative
share θij of ﬁrm j’s proﬁt (see Arrow and Debreu 1954, Debreu 1959). Symbolically,
an Arrow-Debreu economy is an array E = {{(Xi,ui,ai)}i∈N,{Y j}j∈J,{θij}i∈N,j∈J}.
For all i ∈ N and all j ∈ J, Xi and Y j are closed and convex.










(i0a) For i ∈ N, p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ai +
P
j∈J θijp∗ · y∗j and ui(xi) > ui(x∗i) implies
p∗ · xi > p∗ · ai +
P
j∈J θijp∗ · y∗j;








The relative shares θij may be interpreted as representing private proprietorships
of the production possibilities and facilities. With this interpretation, we can think of
consumer i as owning the technology set θijYj at his disposal in ﬁrm j. Consequently,







We denote elements in ˜ Y i by ˜ yi =
P
j∈J θijyij for some yij ∈ Y j, j ∈ J. The
reader is referred to Rader (1964, pp. 160–163) and Nikaido (1968, p. 285) for
a justiﬁcation of this understanding of the consumers’ ownership shares. With
equation (22), the Arrow-Debreu economy E is converted into an economy with
household production which we denote by ˜ E = {(Xi,ui,ai, ˜ Y i)}i∈N.
Rader showed that an Arrow-Debreu economy E with convex production possi-
bility sets is equivalent to economy ˜ E, in the sense that the competitive allocations
are the same across the two economies (see Rader 1964, pp. 160–163):
Theorem 6 Let E = {{(Xi,ui,ai)}i∈N,{Y j}j∈J,{θij}i∈N,j∈J} be an Arrow-Debreu
economy and let ˜ E = {(Xi,ui,ai, ˜ Y i)}i∈N with ˜ Y i given in (22). Then, for any CE
((x∗i)i∈N,(y∗j)j∈J,p∗) of E, there are production plans ˜ y∗i ∈ ˜ Y i, i ∈ N, such that
((x∗i, ˜ y∗i)i∈N,p∗) is a CE of ˜ E. Conversely, for any CE ((x∗i, ˜ y∗i)i∈N,p∗) of ˜ E, there
are production plans y∗j, j ∈ J, such that ((x∗i)i∈N,(y∗j)j∈J,p∗) is a CE of E.
4.3 Rader’s Equivalence Principle
Rader (1964) considers how to transform an economy with household production into
an exchange economy using induced preferences. He shows that all the properties
pertaining to the consumers’ characteristics in a production economy go over to
the induced exchange economy. Furthermore, the CEs of the original economy and
those of the induced exchange economy are equivalent (see Rader 1964, pp. 155-
57). It follows that our credit mechanism and results in the previous sections can
be extended to a production economy via its induced exchange economy.
195 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated the possibilities to enlarge the general-equilibrium
structure by allowing default subject to appropriate credit limits and penalties.
The enlargement of the general equilibrium structure results in a construction of a
simple credit mechanism for a credit using society to select a unique CE.
The implementation of the credit mechanism involves a bank providing ban-
knotes that traders use as a direct and anonymous means of payment. The traders
exchange personal IOUs for banknotes with exogenously speciﬁed credit lines at the
beginning, and they settle up all outstanding credits with the bank at the end of
the market. Under the credit mechanism, ending as a net debtor is penalized while
ending as a net creditor is worthless.
Given price normalization and default penalties, we characterized the CEs that
will be selected by the credit mechanism. They are those CEs with traders’ marginal
utilities of income dominated by the corresponding per-unit default penalties. Ap-
plying this result, we showed that in general price normalization exists under which
the credit mechanism selects a unique CE with some non-discriminatory default
penalty. Furthermore, with the additional condition that for some bundle with a
positive quantity of each good, the derivatives of the traders’ utility functions at
each Pareto optimal allocation along the direction represented by the bundle do not
dominate those at every other Pareto optimal allocation, price normalization calling
for an equal value of the bundle guarantees that any CE can be a unique selection
for the credit mechanism with appropriate default penalties.
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